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INTRODUCTION

The theory of causal attribution has its foundations in
naive psychology (Heider, 1958), an attempt to explain human
behavior from the layman's point of view.

Basic to this ap-

proach is the assumption that all men attempt an understanding
of human nature and that personal theories have a definite influence on subsequent behavior.
Attribution theory
Heider noted that an integral aspect of common sense
psychology is the attribution of causality.

The exact meaning

of a particular behavior, as well as the appropriate response to
it, is often uncertain.

Knowledge of the determinants of the be-

havior can, however, aid in its interpretation.

For instance, a

behavior such as tardiness, may take on very different meanings
depending upon whether it happened intentionally or accidentally.
Heider (1958) outlined an approach to the study of causal
perception.

The formal theories of attribution (Jones & Davis,

1965; Kelley, 1967) developed from the ideas of Heider's outline.
First to appear was Jones and Davis' theory of correspondent inferences.

Theirs is a theory of how humans perceive specific

intentions or attributes from observations of specific actions. A

2

second, though complementary theory, was proposed by Kelley
(1967) which can be referred to as the theory of external attribution.
Basic to Kelley 1 s theory is his concern with the differentiation of
environmental from personal causality.
According to Jones and Davis, the perceiver attempts to
label an attribute which has the highest correspondence to a given
effect.

Correspondence, for a particular attribute effect linkage,

appears to increase as the attribute in question departs from the
norm of social desirability.

In other words, an attribute effect

linkage which deviates from the norm has a greater probability of
reflecting the actor 1 s true intention.
Correspondence is also achieved through the examination of
noncommon effects.

Correspondence refers to the examination of

the alternative actions which would have produced a different effect
than that which occurred,

This procedure may provide the per-

ceiver with clues regarding the actor 1 s exact goals or intentions.
Personal involvement of the perceiver with the effect also
is assumed to influence the attribution process.

Two levels of in-

volvement have been distinguished, hedonic relevance and personalism.

If an eff.ect either promotes or interferes with the perceiver 1 s

goals it is said to be hedonically relevant.

If the perceiver judges

that he himself is the object of the action then a condition of personalism results.

Correspondence is said to increase in direct proportion

to increases in personal involvement.
Kelley (1967, 1971, 1972, 1973) has approached this problem

,
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area from perhaps a wider perspective, considering not just an
analysis of intentions but also the environmental and circumstantial
determinants of behavior.

This approach rests on the observation

that persons are often seen as being determined by factors external
to themselves.

Particular then, to Kelley's approach is the problem

of external versus internal causality.
Kelley's analysis describes two cases which may exist for
an observer faced with the problem of attributing causality.

In

the first case the observer has information from multiple obs ervations.

In these cases the attributor must rely on what Kelley calls

covariation concepts.

In the second case the observe.r has informa-

tion from only a single observation.

In these cases he must rely

on the configuration of possible causes in order to gain insight into
the determining factors.
Formally stated, the principle of covariation asserts, "An
effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with which,
over time it covaries" (Kelley, 1973, p. 108).

Kelley uses an

analysis of variance analogy to describe how such a principle
operates in the observer.

This model represents a three-way

analysis of entities and persons over time.

For example, if a

behavior is seen to covary over time and entities for a particular
individual, then attributions will tend to be personal.

On the other

hand, if a behavior is seen to covary over time across a number
of persons then an environmental inference is the more likely
cause.

i!
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Such an analysis can also be described in terms of three
factors:

the distinctive association of the response to the stim-

ulus, the consensus of other persons' responses, and the consistency of the response over time and modalities.

These factors,

alone or in combination, produce information leading to distinctive types of attributive outcomes.

For example, high distinct-

iveness inclines one to make an entity attribution, whereas low
consensus leads to personal attributions.
In cases where only a single observation is made the attributor must rely on the availability of other sorts of information.
Such information may concern the plausibility of other causes, The
discounting principle represents the use of such information. Formally stated, the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is
discounted if other plausible causes are also present.

The dis-

counting principle is an example of the configuration concept mentioned above.
principle.

Another configuration concept is the augmentation

This principle refers to cases where an action takes

place though inhibitory factors are present.

Under this configura-

tion, if an action took place in the presence of a strong external inhibitor, the attributions to the person would be augmented.
The use of these configuration concepts implies what Kelley
calls causal schemata.

A causal schema represents the assumed

pattern of data regarding the possible causes in terms of a given
effect and is an ext ens ion of the analysis of variance analogy. Each

II
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configuration implies its corresponding schema.

The discounting

principle implies a multiple sufficient schema, while the augmentation principle implies the compensatory schema.

A third case is
I

the multiple necessary schema.

Under these conditions, both in-

ternal and external causes must be present in order for the given
effect to occur.
The actor and observer bias in causal attribution
Until recently the formal theories of attribution have neglected consideration of the actor and observer biases with regard

to the perception of causality.

Heider (1958) first observed that

actors and observers tend to perceive the determinants of an action
,i''

differently.

Observers tend to attribute personal responsibility to

the actor for his performance while actors tend to perceive their
own behavior as a response determined by the particular situation.
Some evidence in support of the proposition has been gathered by researchers studying other aspects of attribution theory (Jones
& Harris, 1967;

Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals & Ward, 1968;

Jones, Worchel & Grumet, 1971; McArthur, 1972).

Ij

These re-

searchers report that there is a tendency for observers to take the
behavior of an actor at face value as indicative of his true intentions
or dispositions.

This tendency appeared to be one of the most potent

determinants of the attribution process in these studies.

Observers

in the Jones and Harris (1967) study listened to pro Castro and anti
Castro speeches by students supposedly on the college debate team.
I:Jalf of the observers were under the impression that the students

. :I
I I
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were given no freedom in chaos ing the position of their talk
while the other half of the observers were told that the students
were given this freedom of choice.

Regardless of the choice

condition observers tended to assume that the communicators
held the position espoused.

The fact that a communicator was

under heavy external pressure to perform in a particular way
apparently had little effect on the observers tendency to make dispositional attributions.

Recently, this same study was replicated

by Jones, Worchel, Goethals and Grumet (1971), using the legalization of marijuana as the debate topic.

Essentially the same re-

sults were obtained.
Attributions were made by both actor subjects and observer
subjects in the Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals and Ward (1968)
study.

The experimenters provided their subjects with false feed-

back regarding the results of a rigged I. Q. test.

Then they were

asked whether the performance was due to item difficulty, a situational factor or the ability of the test taker, a dispositional factor.
Actor subjects and observer subjects differed markedly in their
attributions.

Actor subjects tended to attribute changes in per-

formance to changes in item difficulty.

Observers, however, at-

tributed changes in performance to variations in the ability of the
performer.
McArthur (1972) attempted a lengthy study designed to test
the accuracy of Kelley's notions concerning the effects of distinctiveness, consistency and consensus information in causal attribution.

f
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Subjects were presented with short sentences which described the
behavior of a hypothetical actor in terms of the above three factors.
Although the experimental and control groups did differ in their
attributions, the most frequent response for either group was a
I, ,

dispositional attribution.
More direct tests of this phenomenon have been attempted
in an additional study by McArthur (1972) as well as studies by
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Marecek (1971) and by Storms (1973).
McArthur's research involved asking actor subjects why they consented to participate in a survey and then comparing their responses
with those of observers who received a written report of the actor's

.: II
1
; II

behavior.

As expected, actors thought that their behavior was due

to the importance of the survey while the observers seemed to
think that the actors' behavior was due to their predisposition to
participate in surveys.
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Maracek (1971) conducted a
series of experiments dealing directly with the bias.

Their first

effort was similar in design to McArthur's second experiment in
that actors were induced to volunteer for a project while both
actors and observers made causal attributions.

The experiment

differed from McArthur's in that the observers were actually
present at the time of the performance.

As expected, the observers

assumed that the actors would behave in a similar manner on future
occasions.

This was interpreted as a dispositional attribution.

i
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Actors themselves, however, did not share in this assumption,
believing instead that their behavior was limited to that particular
situation.

In a second study, the researchers asked their subjects

to describe the reasons for their own and their best friend's choices
of a girl friend and college major.

Subjects were found to describe

their own choices as resulting from the unique qualities of the choice
object.

On the other hand, descriptions of the reasons for the best

friend's choices reflected the unique dispositional properties of the
friend.

A third study required subjects to describe a stimulus per-

son in trait or situational terms.

The stimulus persons used were

the subject himself, a best friend, his father, an admired acquaintance and the television commentator Walter Cronkite.

The results

indicated that subjects used a significantly greater number of trait
adjectives while describing another than when describing themselves.
A final study, to be described in greater detail in another
section, lends still more evidence to this proposition that actors
and observers perceive the cause of behavior differently.

An

experiment conducted by Storms (1973) required previously unacquainted actor subjects to converse with each other for a brief
time.

Observer subjects were also present.

Essentially no other

manipulations took place for several conditions of this experiment.
In these conditions, actors demonstrated a strong tendency to
attribute their behavior to factors related to the situation.

Con-

9

vers ely, observers tended to make attributions in terms of the
actor's disposition.
Theoretical considerations
In view of the abundance of evidence, Jones and Nisbett
(1971) have attempted a thorough theoretical treatment of this
phenomenon.

i I

This difference between actor's and observer's

perceptions of causality was thought to stem from possible differences in the information available to the actor and observer concerning the actor's behavior and also from possible differences in
the way the present behavioral data is perceived.
Obviously the observer lacks much information which may
I ~I

i

(1

be useful in the determination of causality.

This information

!I

"
I'

would consist of knowledge of the actor's subjective experience
concerning his emotions and intentions and his perceptions of the
situation.

The observer may also lack knowledge of how the actor

has performed in the past.

Jones and Nisbett (1972) have proposed

that this difference in the knowledge of the actor's past behavior
may, in part, account for the observer's tendency to rely on the
actor's present behavior in determining causality.

This historical

data concerning the actor's behavior represents what Kelley (1967)
has labeled as consistency data.

Consistency data represents one

of the clues in determining personal or situational causality.

If a

person responds consistently in a certain manner across a wide
variety of situations, then an inference of personal causality tends

!
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to be made.

On the other hand, if the actor responds inconsistently,

then there is reason to conclude that his behavior depends upon the
situation.

The research of McArthur (1972) appears to confirm

the above proposition.

Subjects were presented with short descrip-

tions of an actor's behavior.

Distinctiveness, consensus and con-

sistency information were included in the descriptions with the
various levels of these factors varied across descriptions.

Con-

sistency information proved to be a powerful factor leading to greater
personal attributions when consistency was high and a greater number
of situational attributions when consistency was low.
Since observers often lack consistency type information about
the actor, they are forced to weigh what other information they

i
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possess more heavily.

This lack of information would lead one to

expect a tendency for the observer to take the present behavior at
face value.

On the other hand, the actor is liable to recall at least

several instances when he responded differently in a similar situation.

This additional information might predispose the actor to

treat his present behavior as less indicative of his true disposition
than would an observer.
A second possible explanation for the actor and observer
differences in attributions may be found in the divergence of perspectives from which they view the behavioral sequence.

Jones

and Nisbett have observed that the first person or actor point of
view is one in which the focus of attention is primarily directed

11

upon the environmental situation rather than upon the behavior
itself.

It is thought that this perspective is due, at least in part,

to the outward orientation of one's sensory apparatus.

Thus the

orientation of the actor is such that he attends to and utilizes the
information concerning the situation more than that of his own behavior.
On the other hand, the observer's orientation is better
suited to view the behavior of the actor since the actor is a part of
the observer's environment.

There is a tendency, then, for the

observer to attend to and utilize more of the information concerning
the actor's behavior than the actor does himself.
These divergent perspectives for actors and observers
which lead to differences in the attention to and the utilization of
data could conceivably account for their apparent disagreement concerning the attribution of causality.
Support for this hypothesis is found in the study (Storms,
1973) in which perspective was manipulated through an alteration
of the subjects 1 visual orientation towards a behavioral sequence.
After viewing the behavioral sequence in vivo, a number of actors
and observers reviewed the incident through the use of videotape.
For half of these subjects, both actors and observers, a reorientation of perspective took place.

This was accomplished by showing

the subjects a videotape taken from a camera angle which differed
from their original angle of view.

For observers, the change in

I,
'<
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perspective was from the third person point of view.
the change was from the first person to the third.

For actors,

The remaining

subjects in this experiment either re-experienced the behavior
from their original point of view or received no videotape exposure
at all.

This study revealed that actors who viewed their own be-

havior from the third person (observer) perspective would tend to
reverse the actor bias and make predominantly dispositional attributions.

Likewise, observers who viewed the actor's behavior

from the first person (actor) perspective were found to perceive
the situation as the cause of the behavior.

Thus, it appears as

though visual perspective differences can account for s orne of the
actor and observer differences in causal attribution.
The relative effectiveness of information and perspective
Consistency information as well as perspective have been
established as influential in determining perceptions of causality.
It is not clear, however, which mechanism is the more powerful
factor or if they interact in s orne way.

The degree of emphasis

to be placed on each of these mechanisms has been a point of
theoretical disagreement.

Heider, it appears, emphasized the

effects of information while Jones and Nisbett emphasize perspective.

A determination of the more influential factor would appear

necessary in attempting to draw a conclusion regarding the generality of the phenomenon.

Perspective differences between actors and

observers are relatively invariant.

If perspective is the more

13

crucial factor, then one would expect a persistence of the actor
and observer disagreement across various degrees of familiarity, similarity or any other factor which might tend to increase
the amount of information shared by the actor and observer.

If,

on the other hand, perspective is a relatively weak mechanism
operating effectively only when other information is lacking,
then one may discount the all per vas ivenes s of the phenomenon
under conditions where a real effort has been made to supply the
observer with the necessary information.
Jones and Nisbett's emphasis upon perspective may be
due to the persistence of the observer bias in such studies (i.e.
Jones and Harris, 1967; McArthur, 1972) where compelling situational information was supplied.

However, there is some evidence

that the degree of acquaintance, and hence knowledge of the actor's
past behavior, may attenuate the effects of perspective.

This evi-

dence comes from the third study reported by Nisbett et. al. (1971).
They observed that within a specific category of acquaintance, greater
familiarity with the stimulus person decreased the tendency to assign
traits,

This evidence, however, is only correlational and may re-

fleet other factors than just knowledge of the actor's past.
The relative effectiveness of these two factors could be
measured in an experiment which would simultaneously manipulate
perspective and the presence or absenc'e of consistency type information.

However, on the basis of the available evidence, spe-

cific hypotheses seem unwarranted.

A number of possible outcomes

I'
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coul.d result.

If perspective was the overhwelmingly potent

mechanism, then the presence or absence of either consistent
or inconsistent information shoul.d have negligible effects.

If

perspective was only important when other information is lacking, then one should observe strong perspective effects under an
absence of information condition and small perspective effects
when either consistent or inconsistent information is provided.
If, however, both perspective and information are equally im-

portant, then uniformly significant results should be obtained with
no interactions.

,:l!i

''
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METHOD
Overview
This experiment consisted of a manipulation of both perspective and information in a two by three factorial design with
subjects randomized across conditions.

The manipulation of

perspective varied from the first person to the third person
point of view.

Consistent, inconsistent and consistency irrele-

vant information was presented in a three-way manipulation of
this variable.

These manipulations were carried out in terms of

a videotape which depicted the behavior of a principle character
along a dimension of generosity.

The tape consisted of two sections.

The first section provided the manipulation of consistency.

The

second section consisted of the critical behavioral sequence for
which the attributions were to be made.
First, a series of four scenes took place in which a history
of behavior relevant to generosity was formed.

In the consistent

condition, aU four scenes represented instances of generous behavior.

Inconsistency of behavior was conveyed by having the

actor behave in a non-generous fashion in the first and fourth scenes
while behaving in a generous fashion in the remaining two.

A third

condition where consistency type information was lacking altogether
was produced by padding the four scenes with material which was
unrelated to the behavior in question.
In the original design of this experiment, the manipulation

16

of perspective was to have taken place in this first section as
well as in the second.

This would have consisted of presenting

the four prior scenes as well as the final one from the actor and
observer points of view.

After the initiation of the experiment,

but before the final data were collected and analyzed, it became
apparent to the experimenter that this method would introduce the
possibility of several alternative yet plausible hypotheses in regard to the effects of consistency.

The correct isolation of the

consistency variable necessitates that the history be presented in
an identical manner across levels of perspective.

A simultaneous

manipulation of the two variables might cause them to interact
in such a way as to alter the subject•s perception of the information variable.

Thus, it would not be possible to make clear com-

parisons of the effects of perspective across similar levels of information.
An alternative design pres en ted the manipulation of the
perspective variable only during the final scene of the tape.

In

this final scene the principle actor engaged in an extended example
of generous behavior.

The subjects were required to make their

attributional responses in regards to this scene.
The videotape
The total film consisted of five short scenes, the first
four lasting about thirty seconds each, the final one taking almost
two minutes.

The film appears to follow a typical Loyola University

student through some typical casual campus encounters.

In the

17

initial scene the actor approached a male student attempting to
make a telephone call.

In both the consistent and inconsistent

conditions the phone caller requested a dime from the actor, The
actor either complied (consistent) or refused (inconsistent).

In

the consistency irrelevant condition the phone caller made no requests of the actor.

The second scene did not vary between con-

ditions of consistency and depicted the actor in conversation with
a couple of friends who ultimately ask him if he would drop a book
off at the library.

The actor then agreed to do the favor.

In the

condition of irrelevant information no request of the actor was
made.

The third scene depicted the actor providing a fellow male

student with directions.

This scene also did not vary across con-

ditions relevant to consistency but in the condition of irrelevant
information the actor only passed the student at the entrance to an
escalator.

In the fourth scene a young co-ed accidently dropped her

books near the actor.

The actor either assisted (consistent) or ig-

nored her (inconsistent).

In the irrelevant information condition

the girl just passed by.
The final scene depicted the behavior upon which the attributions were made.

The actor 1 s behavior was constant through-

out all three conditions of information.

The episode began as the

actor approached an attractive young co-ed stranded along the road
with a flat tire.

She petitioned the actor for aid and in all cases

he obliged.
Taken individually, these five scenes were presented in

18

such a manner as to appear ambiguous with respect to the dispositional and situational characteristics of the actor's behavior,

It

was anticipated that this ambiguity would aid in the proper functioning of the manipulations.
Subjects
One hundred eighteen male and female Loyola University
undergraduate students participated in this experiment as part
of their laboratory requirement for an introductory psychology
course.
Procedure
A videotape monitor was set up in a large room adequate
to accommodate half of the required subjects for each condition.
The experimenter instructed the subjects in the following manner:
This experiment consists of the viewing of a
short film, about four minutes in length, which
follows a typical Loyola student during his everyday travels through campus, Your job, as participants in this experiment, is to be as attentive as
possible while watching this film. Afterward, you
will be asked to answer a few questions concerning
the content of this film.
The tape was then shown.

Immediately afterwards the dependent

measures were distributed,
Dependent measures
The subjects were presented with a series of questions pre-

I
I

ceded by a page of instructions,

The instructions were as follows:

The following section of this questionnaire
concerns your impressions of the principal
character's behavior during the final scene of
the film. You will be asked to describe his

19

behavior along a standard dimension of generosity. Then you are to indicate how much influence each of the following two factors had in
causing him to behave in the way he did. The
first of these two factors is the Personal Characteristics about the student. For example, his
personality traits, character, personal style, attitudes, mood, and so on. The second factor is
the Characteristics of the Situation. For example,
such factors might be the location of the incident;
the nature of the other persons involved, how these
other persons behaved, the presence of observers,
as well as any other unique aspects of the circumstance.
Each of these questions is followed by a nine
step scale. The ends of the scales are labelled
with extreme and opposite adjectives. The numbers
toward the middle of the scale represent the various
degrees intervening between the two adjectives. You
are to circle the number which best fits your impression of the actor's behavior.
The dependent measures followed closely those utilized
by Storms (1973).

This was done in order to increase the compar-

ability of the two experiments.

The first and fourth questions

comprised the Present Behavior-General Behavior (PB-GB)
Index.

This is an indirect measure of the degree to which the

subjects thought the principal character's behavior was due to the
situation.

The first question measured the subjects' perception

of the actor's level of generous behavior in the final scene (present
behavior).

The fourth question determined the actor's general

level of generosity.

The scores from these two measures were then

subtracted and the absolute difference indicated the degree of situational
attribution.

An absolute difference was used since any deviation of

present behavior from general behavior was indicative of situational
determination.

These two questions were phrased as follows:

,,I

I
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To what extent, in the final scene, did the
student behave in a generous manner?

l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9
very
self-seeking

very
generous

How generous a person do you feel this student
is in general?

!

l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9
very
self-seeking

very
generous

The second and third questions comprized the key dependent measure of attribution.

The second question measured

the degree of dispositional attribution.
degree of situational att''ribution.

The third measured the

The situational scores for each

~

II

subject was then subtracted from his dispositional scores to pro-

I
,i:l
'I,

duce the Dispositional-Situational (D-S) Index.

A positive score

on this index indicates a dispositional attribution while a negative
score indicates a situational attribution.

These questions were

as follows:
How important was the student's personal
character is tics in determining his behavior during
the final scene?

l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9
very
unimportant

very
important

How important were the characteristics of the
situation found in the final scene in determining
his behavior in the final scene?

l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9
very
unimportant

very
important

I,

I
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A few filler items followed before the measurement of
the degree of consistency perceived to exist between the prior and
final scenes.

The question was as follows:

Did you find the behavior of the actor in the
final scene consistent with his behavior prior
to this scene?

l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9
very
inconsistent

very
cons is tent

r'
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RESULTS

Manipulation check
Before examining the effects of the experimental variables on attribution scores a consideration of their effectiveness
as manipulations is in order.

Since the manipulation of perspective

represented a rather straightforward mechanical procedure manipulation checks were not deemed necessary.
The manipulation check for the information factor consisted
of a question which dealt with the degree to which the actor's prior
behavior was felt to be cons is tent or inconsistent with his behavior
during the critical scene.

The relevant data for this measure are

presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1.
Consistency Means
Information
Perspective
of Final-Scene
Consistent

Inconsistent

Irrelevant

First
Person

7. 16 ab

5.77bc

6. 16b

Third
Person

8.05

4. 50

6. 05b

a

c

Those cells not sharing the same subscript differ
at the . 05 level. The higher mean indicate a
greater perception of consistency.
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The analysis of variance indicated a significant main
effect in the predicted direction for the information factor
("!:_'=10. 80, df=2/102, E< . 01,) with no interactions.

Comparisons

of conditions, using the Duncan's Multiple Range Test, reveal
that significant differences did exist between conditions of consistent and inconsistent inforn1ation.

This difference, however,

only reached the. 10 level in the comparison of consistency levels
within the first person perspective.

All other comparisons be-

tween consistent and inconsistent conditions did reach significance
at the. 01 level.

Within the third person perspective, all compari-

sons of inconsistent and consistent conditions with conditions of
irrelevant information differed at significant levels (E.;(. . 05 ).
Significant differences of this sort were not found within the first
person perspective.

In addition, within the level of inconsistent in-

formation, differences were indicated between levels of perspective,
though only at the . 10 level.

It would appear as though the manipula-

tion rnet the rninimum standards of effectiveness.

However, note

should be taken of the fact that a much weaker effect occurred under
the first person perspective.
The dis pos iiion<l:l- s iLuational index
The D-S index represented the rnajor dependent variable
in the study.

Table 2 presents the data for this measure.

An

analysis of variance indicated that a main effect occurred under
the inforrnation variable (-!::'=8. 48, df=2 /102,
did not occur for the perspective variable

E.< . 01).

(~=1,

A main effect

df=l/102, n. s.)

Thus

it would appear that the inforrnation variable was the more crucial

d

r

factor in detert--nlning attributions.

TABLE 2.
Attribution means for the D-S Index
Information
Perspective
of Final Scene
Cons is tent
First
Person

0

Third
Person

l. 50

Inconsistent

Irrelevant

-1. 94

-. 388

abc

-1. 94

a

b

b

-. 722

abc

be

Those cells not sharing the same subscript differ at the
. 05 level. The more positive the means the greater the
attribution to the person.

An examination of individual comparisons using the Duncan•s Test indicates that subjects from both perspective conditions
who received consistent inforrnation concerning the actor's behavior made more dispositional attributions than either groups
receiving inconsistent information.

Although these differences

are significant at the . 01 level for the third person perspective
comparisons, they are only significant at the . 10 level for subjects
receiving the first person perspective.

In addition, the presence

of consistent information had some effect in inflating dispositional
attributions over those that occurred when irrelevant information
was presented.

This, however, was only noticed for subjects

viewing the tape under the third person perspective (E.< . 05 ).

r
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Although the main effects of perspective are negligible, a
significant interaction did occur between information and the point
of view (F=3. 90, d£=2/102,

.E.<. . 05) as seen in Figure l (P. 26).

In this interaction, the only notable difference in attributions within levels of information but across levels of perspective occurs
under tbe consistency condition.

Apparently, the first person

perspective interacted in son"le way with the consistency informaI

tion to depress dispositional scores.

The difference between at-

tributions at this point is at best only marginally significant at the
. 10 level.
The present behavior;..general behavior index
The PB-GB index measures the degree to which the actor's
behavior was felt to deviate from his behavior in general.

High

scores on this index indicate greater deviation and hence greater
situational attribution than low scores.
for this index.

Table 3 contains the data

Consistent with the analysis for the D-S index, a

significant main effect for information was obtained (F=5. 69,
df=2/l02,

.E.<.. 05).

However, the PB-GB measure showed a slight

effect for perspective (F=3. 39, df=l/102,

.E.< . 10).

Unlike the case

with the D-S measure, a significant interaction was not found. The
analysis of individual comparisons indicates that these main effects
can be predominately attributed to the extremely high situational
scores found in tbe condition of the first person perspectivc-inconsistent information.

This cell significantly differed from all others

at the. 05 level using the Duncan's Multiple Range Test.

I.
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FIGURE I
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INFORMATION

Attribution means of first and third perspectives
across levels of information for the D-S Index.
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TABLE 3.
Attribution means for the PB-GB Index
Inforrnation

Perspective
of Final Scene
Consistent

Inconsistent

Irrelevant

First
Person

1. oob

l. 88 a

. 94b

Third
Person

. 72

l. 27

. 77b

b

b

Those cells not sharing the sam.e subscript differ
at the . 05 level. The higher mean indicate greater
attributions to the person.
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DISCUSSION

Summary of results
The manipulation of consistency type information appears
to have been a valid one in that the manipulation check, consisting
of consistency ratings yielded significant differences between
levels of this factor.

The manipulation of perspective, consisting

of a rather straightforward mechanical procedure, should also be
considered valid.
Considering this evidence of internal validity one may then
state that in this present effort, prior information rather than perspective appears to be the factor which determined attributions of
causality.

This conclusion is based upon data from two measures of

attributions, each indicating a main effect for information and only
marginal effects for perspective.

These marginal effects for per-

spective consisting of the significant interaction obtained with the
D-S index and the slight main effect indicated with the PB- GB index.
Questions of external validity - a comparison with Kelley and Storms
The external validity of this study should be considered.

The

influences of prior information are basically in agreement with those
predicted from Kelley's theory of attribution (Kelley, 1967).

Over-

all, consistent information produced somewhat higher dispositional
ratings than did inconsistent information, which tended to influence
a situational rating.

Individual comparisons, however, were not con-

sistently significant in this regard.

For instance, in the analysis of
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the PB-GB measure, the comparison between levels of information
within the third person perspective failed to reach significance
even at a . 10 level.

In addition, conditions where consistent or in-

consistent information was presented often failed to differ from
those conditions where consistency irrelevant information was
presented.

This is especially evident in the analysis of the PB-GB

measure where attribution totals for groups who received consistent
prior information were identical with those who received irrelevant
information.

It is also evidenced in the analysis of the D-S index

where comparisons of irrelevant information conditions failed to
differ significantly from those groups receiving either condition of
inconsistent information along with first person perspective and
those groups receiving inconsistent information with the third per-

l
f

i

son perspective.

These observations may be indicative of the limits

of effect on information to influence attribution.

However, it is also

I

plausible to suppose that a ceiling effect was reached under the ex-

I

treme levels of information.

j

I

II

Differences in the intermediate range

would then be insignificant.
The data from this study should also be examined with respect to the research of Storms (1973).

In that experiment an ex-

tremely potent effect was obtained from the manipulation of perspective.

Though no manipulation of prior information was attempted

in the Storms' research, the two experiments are comparable if one
considers those conditions of the present experiment where cons istency irrelevant information was present.

It was within these
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conditions that the pure effects for perspective were supposedly
measured.

Neither for the D-S or the PB-GB measure were the

levels of perspective found to differentially influence attributions
within this level of information.

One possible explanation for this

finding might be that a threshold effect occurred.

In other words,

the influence of perspective was not in itself strong enough to produce observable differences in attributions.

This factor, however,

in combination with consistent or inconsistent information surpassed
the threshold.

Thus, the influence of perspective was only observed

under conditions of consistency relevant information.
Storms, nevertheless, did observe significant differences
between levels of perspective.

His method differs from that of the

present experiment in that Storms' subjects experienced a reorientation of perspectives.

The contrast between the first and

second orientations may have heightened the saliency of cues pertinent to a change in attributions.

The fact that a re-orientation

occurred may prove to be crucial in the attainment of a strong perspective effect.
Conclusions and questions
Though factors related to information had the greater influence in the present study, caution must be exercised in drawing
any general conclusions regarding the determinants of the actor
and observer bias.

The plausibility of Jones and Nisbett's (1972)

proposal that perspective differences account for the bias remains
strong.

I
I
'
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Any factor which could account for the bias must possess
certain qualifications.

The levels of this factor must character-

ize a reliable and distinctive difference between actors and observers.

Perspective represents a very parsimonious choice in

that it represents a rather basic and persistent difference between actors and observers.

The fact that perspective had little

influence in the present study suggests the possibility that perspective differences in vivo may encompass more than just those
determined by visual orientation.

The actor's attention to his

environment may also be due to certain motivational factors.

Cer-

tainly a high degree of environmental surveillance is required for
survival.

A response is adaptive only insofar as it meets the re-

quirements of the situation.

Thus there is a possibility that the

utilization of situational information may be quite different for an
actor in vivo as compared with an actor simulation with videotape.
The choice of consistency type information as the determining factor for the actor and observer bias rests on the assumption
that actors generally perceive their behavior as less cons is tent
than do observers.

As pointed out by Heider (1958) and Jones and

II
!

Nisbett (1972), this may be a reasonable assumption.

However, one

may not assume that such information is present in natural settings
to the same degree found in the present experiment.

Thus one has

little assurance that consistency type information is such an important variable outside the experimental laboratory.
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Additional research concerning the determinants of the
actor and observer bias is required before any general conclusion
can be drawn.

Such research should be attempted in both labora-

tory as well as in more naturalistic settings.

Note should be taken

regarding what differences exist between the two procedures and
results.

Only then will one be able to correctly estimate the true

effect of perspective and consistency in person perception .

.....

r
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SUMMARY

Two variables were investigated as relevant to the determination of the actor and observer bias in causal attribution.
These two variables, visual perspective and information regarding the consistency of an actor's behavior were simultaneously
manipulated in a two by three factorial design.

Subjects viewed a

videotape which provided consistent, inconsistent, or consistency
irrelevant information regarding an actor's tendency to behave in a
generous manner.

In a final scene the actor engaged in an example

of generous behavior.

This scene was either viewed by the sub-

jects from the first person perspective or from the third person
perspective.
distributed.

The dependent measures of attribution were then
Subjects indicated the degree to which the actor's be-

havior was determined by the situation and by his disposition.

Con-

sistency type information rather than visual perspective was found

to have the greater influence in determining causal attributions.
Subjects receiving information which portrayed the actor as consistently generous felt that his actions were determined by his disi

position.

Conversely, the portrayal of inconsistency with regard

to generosity led subjects to make situational attributions.

Though

the data was only marginally significant, there was some tendency
for perspective to affect attributions.

Subjects who viewed the s e-

quence from the first person perspective tended to make more

'!
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situational attributions than did those subjects who viewed the
sequence from the third person perspective.
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